Material Support to Terrorism Under Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds
Date of Information: 02/22/2026
Check back soon; we update these materials frequently
The “material support” provision is the most frequently applied and most expansively interpreted component of the Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG). It appears in INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) and forms part of the statutory definition of “engaging in terrorist activity.” In practice, this provision has been applied to conduct ranging from the provision of weapons and training to small sums of money, food, shelter, or logistical assistance.
For asylum practitioners, understanding what actually constitutes “material support” requires careful attention to BIA precedent, circuit court decisions, legislative history, and agency adjudicative positions. The statute is broad. The case law confirms that breadth. But it is not limitless.
I. Statutory Framework
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) defines material support to include:
“A safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training.”
The statute applies where the alien “knows, or reasonably should know” that the act affords material support to a terrorist organization or to an individual engaged in terrorist activity.
Key structural points:
The list is illustrative, not exhaustive.
The statute does not require intent to further a terrorist act.
The mens rea standard includes constructive knowledge (“reasonably should know”).
Matter of S-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 936 (BIA 2006), emphasized that there is no legislative history limiting the definition of “material support,” and rejected the argument that the government must prove a link between the support and a specific terrorist act. The Board made clear that the statute requires only that the alien afford material support to a terrorist organization, unless the alien proves lack of knowledge or constructive knowledge of the organization’s character.
II. What “Material” Means: Qualitative, Not Quantitative
The most important precedential interpretation comes from Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. 303 (BIA 2018).
The Board held that an act constitutes “material” support if it has a logical and reasonably foreseeable tendency to promote, sustain, or maintain the organization, even if only to a de minimis degree.
Several principles emerge from A-C-M-:
There is no minimum dollar threshold.
“Material” is not a quantitative requirement.
Even small-scale assistance may qualify.
The statutory examples are not exhaustive.
The Board explained that “material” refers to aid of a material and normally tangible nature, and adopted the Third Circuit’s “logical connection” approach from Singh-Kaur.
Federal Circuits: De Minimis Support Is Still Support
Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft (3d Cir. 2004)
The Third Circuit held that providing modest amounts of food and shelter to individuals whom the alien reasonably should have known were involved in terrorist activity constituted material support. The court emphasized that the statutory list illustrates a broad concept rather than exclusive categories.
Rayamajhi v. Whitaker (9th Cir.)
The Ninth Circuit held that giving $50 to a known Maoist organization constituted material support and that there is no implied de minimis exception.
Hosseini v. Nielsen (6th Cir.)
The Sixth Circuit held that copying and distributing flyers for two terrorist organizations constituted material support. The assistance was nonviolent and informational, yet it qualified.
Jabateh v. Lynch (7th Cir.)
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that support confined to non-terrorist activities of the organization can still qualify, and that “communications” is expressly listed in the statute. Providing assistance to a political or humanitarian wing of an FTO does not avoid the bar.
III. No Intent Requirement
The INA material support bar does not require proof that the alien intended to further terrorist objectives.
Matter of S-K- and Singh-Kaur reject the notion that the government must prove the alien intended to promote terrorist violence. The statutory structure requires only that the alien provide support and know (or reasonably should know) the nature of the organization.
This distinguishes the immigration bar from its criminal analogue under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which requires knowing provision of material support. The INA standard is broader because it includes constructive knowledge.
IV. Knowledge Requirement (What Must the Applicant Know?)
In Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2012), the Fourth Circuit held that the statute requires only that the applicant know he was rendering material support to the recipient of his support, not that he knew the recipient was a terrorist organization.
For Tier I and Tier II designated organizations, knowledge of designation is not required.
For Tier III organizations, there is a limited statutory defense. Under INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd), the applicant may avoid the bar by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know and should not reasonably have known the organization was terroristic. This is a high burden and applies only to undesignated (Tier III) groups.
V. No Implied Duress Exception
Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2016), held that there is no implied duress exception to the material support bar.
Even involuntary assistance may trigger inadmissibility. Relief may be available only through discretionary DHS exemptions, not through statutory interpretation.
The Duress Problem — And the Real Solution
There is no de minimis exception to material support. There is no intent requirement beyond knowledge (or constructive knowledge).
And there is no implied duress exception in the statute.
Matter of A-C-M- confirms that even minimal support can qualify. Matter of M-H-Z- confirms there is no statutory duress defense.
That means this scenario is technically covered:
A father in Afghanistan is stopped at a Taliban checkpoint.
A gun is placed to his daughter’s head.
He hands over the money in his car.
Under a literal reading of INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), that is providing funds to a terrorist organization.
This is where many practitioners — and many adjudicators — experience real discomfort. The statute is broad. It captures conduct that is survival-driven, not ideological.
But the solution is not to argue that duress erases the statutory violation. The solution is the discretionary exemption framework under INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i). Congress delegated authority to DHS to exempt certain material support cases — including support provided under duress. That is the proper procedural path.
So when a client says, “I paid at gunpoint,” the answer is:
Yes, this may technically meet the statutory definition.
No, that does not end the case.
We must build and invoke a discretionary duress exemption.
For step-by-step practical guidance — including what to prove, what to file, and how to frame the argument — see: Invoking TRIG Discretionary Exemptions: Duress and Limited Material Support
VI. Practical Guidance on What Conduct Actually Qualifies as Material Support
Safe House / Shelter
Providing a “safe house” means affirmatively affording lodging, concealment, or operational shelter to members of a terrorist organization. Qualifying conduct commonly includes:
Offering lodging or shelter to members or operatives
Allowing one’s home or property to be used for meetings or concealment
Maintaining or facilitating housing arrangements
See, e.g., Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004) (providing food and shelter to militants constituted material support); Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. 303 (BIA 2018) (adopting “logical connection” test; even small-scale assistance qualifies).
The doctrinal point is that the statute is triggered by an affirmative act that affords shelter — not by mere presence in a location. Cf. legislative history (H.R. Rep. No. 100-882) noting that “running messages or providing food” could trigger exclusion, while “mere membership” alone was not intended to suffice.
Transportation
Transportation-based support involves providing or facilitating movement for the organization or its members. Qualifying conduct may include:
Driving members to meetings or operational sites
Transporting supplies, weapons, or funds
Acting as a courier
Arranging logistics
See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (expressly listing “transportation”); see also Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. at 308 (support need only logically sustain or maintain the organization).
By contrast, being transported by members of a terrorist organization is not the same as providing transportation. The statute requires that the applicant afford transportation.
Funds and Financial Benefit
Courts have consistently held that even small sums qualify. Money is fungible. Requiring proof that the funds financed a particular violent act would undermine the statute. See Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 298–99 (rejecting narrow reading; modest food and shelter constituted material support); see also Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2019) (even $50 to known Maoists constituted material support; no de minimis exception); Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. at 306–08 (no quantitative minimum). Covered conduct can include:
Cash donations (even small amounts)
Transfer of funds
Payment of checkpoint “taxes”
Ransom payments
See, e.g., Singh-Kaur; see also Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2012) (knowledge requirement concerns knowledge of support, not designation).
Communications
“Communications” is expressly listed in the statute. Qualifying conduct may include:
Acting as a messenger
Relaying information
Distributing literature
Providing communication equipment
See Hosseini v. Nielsen, 911 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2018) (copying and distributing flyers constituted material support); see also Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 332 (7th Cir. 2017) (support to nonviolent activities of organization may still qualify; “communications” expressly included).
The key principle: tangible communication assistance is different from abstract sympathy. Matter of A-C-M- emphasized that “material” refers to tangible aid and does not encompass mere ideological expression.
Recruiting and Fundraising
Recruiting members or soliciting funds for an organization typically satisfies the material support bar. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV) (soliciting funds for terrorist organization); see also A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. at 309–10 (statutory examples are illustrative, not exhaustive).
These acts almost always satisfy the “logical connection” test because they directly sustain organizational capacity.
Food and Other Goods
Providing goods — even minimal goods — may qualify if they logically sustain the organization. See Singh-Kaur (food and shelter sufficient); see also Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting arguments for implied exceptions; acknowledging breadth of statute). Practitioners should be aware that DHS has taken the position in litigation that even extremely minimal goods can qualify, and courts have largely deferred to the broad statutory structure.
Mere Membership Is Not Enough
Legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to penalize “mere membership” alone. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-882; cf. Matter of S-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 936 (BIA 2006) (no limitation on definition of “material support,” but statute still requires an act affording support). Passive affiliation, without tangible assistance, does not satisfy § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). There must be an affirmative act that affords support.
The Governing Test
The controlling doctrinal standard remains: Does the conduct have a logical and reasonably foreseeable tendency to promote, sustain, or maintain the organization? See Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. at 308; Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 298.
This requires:
An affirmative act;
Tangible aid;
Knowledge or constructive knowledge; and
logical connection to sustaining the organization.
It does not require proof of linkage to a specific terrorist act, nor proof of substantial financial impact.
Conclusion
Material support under TRIG has been interpreted broadly by the BIA and multiple circuits. Even small, nonviolent, and indirect forms of assistance can qualify. There is no de minimis exception, no specific-intent requirement, and no implied duress exception.
However, the statute still requires an affirmative act providing tangible aid that logically sustains the organization. For practitioners, success depends on disciplined factual development, precise application of the “logical connection” test, and—where coercion is involved—correct invocation of the discretionary exemption framework.
Facing a Material Support Issue in Your Case?
If your client has any contact—voluntary or coerced—with an armed group, terrorist organization, or insurgent actor, the material support bar must be analyzed carefully and early. These cases are highly fact-specific and often turn on precise framing, record development, and proper invocation of discretionary exemption authority. If you are navigating a TRIG issue in asylum, adjustment, or removal proceedings, schedule a consultation to develop a strategy tailored to your client’s posture and procedural stage.
Frequently Asked Questions About Material Support Under TRIG
What is “material support” under U.S. immigration law?
Material support refers to providing tangible assistance to a terrorist organization or to an individual engaged in terrorist activity, where the person knows or reasonably should know the nature of the organization or activity. The definition appears in INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) and includes items such as funds, transportation, communications, safe houses, training, and other material financial benefits. Courts have interpreted this provision broadly.
Does giving a small amount of money count as material support?
Yes. There is no de minimis exception. Even small amounts of money may qualify if they have a logical and reasonably foreseeable tendency to sustain or maintain the organization. See Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. 303 (BIA 2018); Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2019).
Does material support require intent to help terrorism?
No. The statute does not require proof that the person intended to further terrorist violence. It requires that the person knowingly provided support, or reasonably should have known the nature of the organization. See Matter of S-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 936 (BIA 2006); Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2012).
If I did not know the group was officially designated as a terrorist organization, am I still barred?
Possibly. For designated Tier I and Tier II organizations, knowledge of formal U.S. designation is not required. For Tier III organizations (undesignated groups that engage in terrorist activity), there is a limited defense if the applicant can prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she did not know and should not reasonably have known of the organization’s terrorist nature.
Does paying money at a Taliban checkpoint count as material support?
Technically, yes. Payment of funds to a terrorist organization, even under pressure, may fall within the statutory definition because it involves providing funds to a terrorist organization. Whether relief is available depends on whether a discretionary exemption applies.
Is there a duress exception to the material support bar?
There is no statutory duress exception built into INA § 212(a)(3)(B). The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that there is no implied duress defense. See Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2016). However, DHS has authority under INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i) to grant discretionary exemptions in cases involving material support provided under duress.
Does giving food or shelter count as material support?
It can. Courts have held that providing food or shelter to members of a terrorist organization may constitute material support. See Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004). The analysis focuses on whether the assistance logically sustained or maintained the organization.
Is merely living in an area controlled by a terrorist organization considered material support?
No. Mere presence in a terrorist-controlled area, without affirmative assistance, does not automatically constitute material support. The statute requires an affirmative act that affords support.
Can distributing flyers or acting as a messenger count as material support?
Yes. Providing communications assistance, including distributing propaganda materials, has been held to constitute material support. See Hosseini v. Nielsen, 911 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2018).
Does material support automatically bar asylum?
Material support may render a person inadmissible and ineligible for asylum unless a discretionary exemption applies. The analysis depends on the specific facts, the type of organization involved, and whether DHS exercises its exemption authority.
What is a Tier III terrorist organization?
A Tier III organization is an undesignated group that engages in terrorist activity as defined by statute. Unlike Tier I (Foreign Terrorist Organizations formally designated by the U.S.) and Tier II groups, Tier III organizations are determined on a case-by-case basis in immigration proceedings.
What should I do if my client may have provided material support under duress?
The issue must be disclosed and analyzed carefully. In cases involving coercion, practitioners should evaluate whether a discretionary exemption under INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i) may apply and build the record accordingly. Failure to address the issue proactively can result in denial or prolonged adjudication delays.
Can Immigration Judges grant a material support exemption?
No. Immigration Judges do not independently grant TRIG exemptions. The authority to exempt certain terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds rests with the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other executive branch officials.
Is material support treated differently in criminal law?
Yes. The criminal material support statutes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B contain different elements and require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The immigration material support bar under INA § 212(a)(3)(B) operates under a civil, admissibility framework and has been interpreted more broadly in several respects.
Other Helpful Resources:
See Also:
CIL Guide to the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule
